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Abstract— This paper is concerned with safety in (cooper-
ative) adaptive cruise control systems. In these systems, the
speed of the cars is maintained automatically, based on the
preferred speed of the driver and the speed of the preceding car.
Technologies that are used in these systems, such as radar and
radio communication, introduce many factors of uncertainty
in the system. In this paper, we present models for different
adaptive cruise control strategies, in which this uncertainty is
explicitly modelled. By simulating emergency braking situations
under these uncertain circumstances, we find the minimal safe
time headway for these strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, many commercially available cars include
adaptive cruise control (ACC) functionality. This extension to
normal cruise control uses a radar to determine the distance
and relative speed of the preceding vehicle, and controls
the acceleration based on this information. This functionality
increases comfort and safety of the driver.
However, traffic throughput is not necessarily improved:
ACC-equipped vehicles still maintain a rather large following
distance, which has two reasons: first, it is a convenience
system, not a safety system, so the human driver should
have enough time to correct errors made by the ACC, should
they occur. Second, this distance is needed in order not
to exhibit aggressive driving behaviour. Traffic throughput
would be improved if cars would be able to drive closer to
each other. To this end, the notion of cooperative adaptive
cruise control (CACC) is introduced. This extension to ACC
functionality includes direct radio communication between
vehicles. This enables a car to directly communicate its
change in acceleration to its predecessor, which leads to
faster response times.
Current ACC-equipped vehicles maintain a time headway
of at least 1 second to their preceding vehicle, which is
about the same time headway as humans keep on highways.
This distance is ‘safe’, in the sense that if a preceding car
does an emergency brake, there is enough time for the radar
and/or the driver in the following vehicle to react to this.
However, in CACC-controlled vehicles, the time headway
(in the order of 0.x seconds) is much too short for humans
to react to emergency brakes. This means that drivers in
CACC-equipped vehicles have to rely solely on the car’s
ability to detect emergency brakes and to react accordingly.
Determining the minimal safe time headway is therefore
essential for CACC-equipped vehicles.
In this paper, we experimentally determine the minimal
safe time headway for three different controllers: the ACC
controller, that uses radar technology to derive information
about its preceding vehicle; the CACC1 controller, that
communicates the value of the car’s accelerometer to the
following vehicle; the CACC2 controller, that has a built-
in braking model, that estimates the change in acceleration
directly after a braking action occurs, which is before the car
starts decelerating. We test these controllers using different
initial velocities and different initial distances between the
cars.
In our models, different factors of uncertainty are intro-
duced, such as uncertainty in accuracy of radar readings
and uncertainty in communication success. The values for
these uncertainties are based on realistic values that occur in
currently used technology. This uncertainty makes this model
realistic and therefore useful in practice.
Design of CACC is in general concerned with two main
issues: safety and so-called string stability. Most current
research is about the string stability issue, but the safety
issue is largely ignored, especially when taken into account
the uncertainty in information and communication that these
systems have to deal with.
In this paper, we only focus on the safety aspect. Our
safety controller should be able to react to an emergency
brake by its preceding vehicle when necessary. The comfort
controller is concerned with keeping a platoon of cars smooth
(i.e. maintaining a steady velocity) and string stable. String
stability in a platoon means that oscillations in speed within
the platoon will be damped by the following vehicles instead
of amplified.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we discuss related literature. In Section III, we
introduce the model that we used for our research. Section
IV describes the experiments and results. We analyse these
results in Section V, and we conclude the paper in Section
VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In intelligent transportation systems (ITS), we can identify
different branches of research: one is focused on developing
intelligent vehicles in order to improve throughput in high-
way traffic, and the other is focused on including intelligence
in road infrastructure to improve this. The different branches
enable different applications. Smart infrastructure can enable
traffic monitoring and is also able to improve traffic through-
put by means of giving speed advice to the drivers, or directly
to the adaptive cruise control.
Our interest lies in the development of intelligent vehicles.
A first step into this direction is the development of adaptive
cruise control, in which a car computes its distance to the
preceding vehicle by means of a radar. Marsden et al. [5]
provide a comprehensive article about this technology and
its implications on traffic flow.
Taking this technology a step further, we come in de
domain of cooperative adaptive cruise controls (CACC), in
which direct communication between vehicles allow them to
react faster to each other. Van Arem et al. [7] describe the
effect of CACC on traffic flow. They conclude that, when the
penetration level of CACC-equipped vehicles is high enough
(> 60%), traffic stability and throughput is improved. In
Yang et al. [8], a communication protocol is proposed in
order to make a cooperative collision warning system on
highways.
The main application area of CACC technology these
days is platooning. Broggi et al. [1] and Kanellakopoulos
[3] both use image recognition techniques in combination
with sensors to autonomously enable platooning. However,
current technology has improved significantly since then, and
nowadays direct radio communication between vehicles is
used to enable platooning.
In [2], an extensive architecture is given for a layered
multi-agent CACC architecture. The authors use this archi-
tecture to implement both centralised platoons (in which
there is a coordinating platoon leader) and decentralised
platoons (in which all cars operate as equals). Khan et al.
[4] present different platoon (in their paper, convoy) forming
strategies, based on a utility value of a platoon.
One of the missing elements of the above approaches
to designing CACC systems, is that they do not explicitly
account for uncertainty in information and communication.
Machine learning techniques could be a promising new way
of autonomously learning the uncertainty in the vehicles.
An important aspect of platooning is ensuring string sta-
bility within a platoon. A thorough control-theoretic model
of string stability in CACC is presented by Naus et al. [6].
To conclude, current research is mainly about CACC and
how to design and implement these systems. We found that
the safety aspect of the problem, while taking uncertainty
of information and communication into account, is not often
considered, although it crucial to the eventual acceptation of
such systems by the public. Therefore, this will be the main
focus of this research.
III. MODEL
In this section, we describe the model that we used in our
simulations. Since there are many sources for uncertainty in
the model, a mathematical analysis of our model is complex.
We also intend to use this model as a starting point for more
experiments, that would include more complex behaviours
and more uncertainty. This well justifies our choice for
simulation.
A. Cars
We model three types of car: cars containing an adaptive
cruise control (ACC) controller and two different types of
cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC1 and CACC2)
controller. The main difference between the ACC controller
and the two CACC controllers is that the ACC controller uses
radar technology to derive information about the preceding
vehicle, whereas the CACC controllers use direct commu-
nication to derive the same information. This difference
in technology has some implications. First, radar can only
derive information about distance and (relative) velocity.
This means that information about the acceleration of a
preceding car has to be derived from this information. Radio
communication can be much more informative, because any
information can be transmitted, if the car considers it useful.
In our setting, cars only communicate their acceleration.
Second, information that cars know about themselves is
generally more accurate than information that is derived by
a radar.
The controllers only control the acceleration of the vehicle.
Since our experiments take place on a highway with only 1
straight lane, there is no need for incorporating steering or
lane changing in our model.
There are properties that apply to both the simulation of
the ACC and the two CACC controllers. They both share the
same update scheme, that we use in our discrete time-based
simulation. This scheme is depicted in Algorithm 1.
/* ∆t = 0.01 */
foreach timestep t do
ẍt ← compute new a;
ẋt ← ẋt−1 + ẍt∆t;
xt ← xt−1 + ẋt;
end
Algorithm 1: Updating scheme for cars
In this scheme, ẍt is the acceleration of the car at time t,
ẋt is the velocity of the car at time t, and xt is the position
of the car on the road at time t.
There is a small delay between a car’s braking activity
(i.e. pressing the brake pedal) and the actual deceleration of
the car. This delay is 150ms. This means that when a car
decelerates at t = 0 and the car behind hits the brakes at
t = 0.5, the car will start decelerating at t = 0.65.
In this model, car are not allowed to brake harder than
−9m/s2, and they will always obey this law. The maximum
deceleration for each car is −9m/s2, but sometimes cars
brake less hard than they think they do, due to mechanical
limitations. See the section on uncertainty below for more
details about this.
The difference between the ACC and the two CACC
controllers lies in the updating rule for the acceleration. In
the following sections, these updating rules are described in
detail.
1) ACC controller: The ACC controller uses radar tech-
nology to detect the acceleration of the preceding vehicle.
This radar receives measurements at 10Hz (i.e. 10 per
second), and it takes an additional 5ms to process each
measurement. The radar measurements consist of the dis-
tance to the preceding vehicle and the relative velocity to the
preceding vehicle. The acceleration of the preceding vehicle
can be computed according to two consecutive measurements
of the relative velocity.
In Algorithm 2, the pseudocode for the simulation of the
ACC controller is given. The delays in processing radar data
and braking are hardcoded: for example, if a braking activity
occurs, the change in acceleration is then explicitly scheduled
for t+ 0.15.
The radars operate asynchronously, which can be seen
in the algorithm: a radar measurement is done when (t +
radarOffset)%0.1 == 0, with radarOffset in the interval
[0, 0.09].
/* ∆t = 0.01s */
foreach timestep t do
if (t+ radarOffset)%0.1 == 0 then
ẋrelative ← do radar measurement ;
ẋpreceding,now ← ẋrelative + ẋself ;
schedule measurement processing for t+ 0.05;
end
if Scheduled measurement ẋpreceding,now then
ẍ← ẋpreceding,now − ẋpreceding,previous;
Braking activity to achieve ẍ;
end
if Braking activity to achieve ẍ then
schedule change in ẍ for t+ 0.15;
end
if Scheduled change in ẍ then
change ẍ;
end
update ẋ according to ẍ;
update x according to ẋ;
end
Algorithm 2: The simulation of the ACC controller
2) CACC1 controller: Both CACC controllers use direct
car-to-car communication to exchange messages containing
the car’s acceleration. These messages are sent by each car
at a frequency of 10Hz. Sending a message has a delay of
1ms.
The CACC1 controller sends the values from its ac-
celerometer to the following vehicle. Since the delay from
the radar processing is no longer present in this controller,
this controller should be more responsive than the ACC
controller.
In Algorithm 3, the pseudocode for the simulation of
the CACC1 controller is given. The messages are sent
asynchronously, which is hard-coded using a messageOffset
in the interval [0, 0.09].
/* ∆t = 0.01s */
foreach timestep t do
if (t+ messageOffset)%0.1 == 0 then
messageBody = ẍcurrent;
follower receives messageBody at t+ 0.01;
end
if Received message containing ẍ then
Braking activity to achieve ẍ;
end
if Braking activity to achieve ẍ then
Schedule change in ẍ for t+ 0.15;
end
if Scheduled change in ẍ then
change ẍ;
end
update ẋ according to ẍ;
update x according to ẋ;
end
Algorithm 3: The simulation of the CACC1 controller
3) CACC2 controller: The CACC2 controller is an ex-
tension to the CACC1 controller. This extension makes the
CACC2 controller more responsive than CACC1. When a
braking activity occurs in a car, it takes 150ms until the
car actually decelerates. However, the CACC2 cars have a
braking model inside, which estimates the actual deceleration
of the car immediately after the braking activity. This means
that a braking car can send a message containing an esti-
mation of the deceleration before the deceleration actually
happens. This results in much faster response times by the
following vehicles.
In Algorithm 4, the pseudocode for the simulation of
the CACC2 controller is given. The messages are sent
asynchronously, which is hard-coded using a messageOffset
in the interval [0, 0.09].
The algorithm shows that the braking activity results in a
change in acceleration after the mechanical delay of 150ms,
but the message containing the modeled deceleration is
scheduled right away, and sent to the following vehicle in
the next message.
Note that in both CACC algorithms, we use time-based
communication as opposed to event-based communication.
We chose for time-based communication because it is more
robust; a message is sent every 0.1s, instead of only when
something of interest happens (e.g. an emergency brake).
This means that cars can expect messages at a regular
interval, so they can also notice if a message does not arrive.
4) Uncertainty in Information and Communication: The
above algorithms are all not very complicated, and one could
probably compute the minimum safety distance cars should
keep from each other when driving. However, in reality, there
is a lot of uncertainty in measurements and communication.
The information that the cars use for their calculations are all
based on uncertain values and measurements. For example,
radars do not perfectly measure the relative speed to the
/* ∆t = 0.01s */
foreach timestep t do
if (t+ messageOffset)%0.1 == 0 then





follower receives messageBody at t+ 0.01;
end
if Received message containing ẍ then
Braking activity with modeled ẍ;
end
if Braking activity with modeled ẍ then
Schedule change in ẍ for t+ 0.15;
Schedule message with ẍ;
end
if Scheduled change in ẍ then
change ẍ;
end
update ẋ according to ẍ;
update x according to ẋ;
end
Algorithm 4: The simulation of the CACC2 controller
preceding vehicle, it does contain some error. This type of
uncertainty is uncertainty in information.
There is also uncertainty in communication: when a mes-
sage is sent, there is no guarantee that the message will
arrive.
We have modeled both these types of uncertainty. Below
we describe each piece of uncertain information that we
modeled. When we mention a value of σ, the uncertainty
is normally distributed around the correct value µ: N (µ, σ).
• Radar range rate: σ = 0.1m/s. This is the relative
velocity measurement of the radar. This influences the
computation of the preceding car’s deceleration in the
ACC vehicles;
• Failure in radar range rate: 1 in 1000. The radar fails to
measure the relative velocity of the preceding vehicle
in 0.1% of the cases;
• Own velocity: σ = 0.1m/s. This also influences the
computation of the preceding car’s deceleration in the
ACC vehicles;
• Own max braking power: σ = 0.3m/s2 one-sided. This
is the error in a car’s estimation of its own maximum
braking power. For example, it could be that a car
thinks it can brake with −9m/s2, while in reality this
is 8.7m/s2. It is one-sided, since −9m/s2 is a car’s
maximum braking power. This influences the CACC2
messages with the modeled braking power;
• Own modeled acceleration: σ = 0.3m/s2. This is the
uncertainty of the estimation of the acceleration when
a braking action occurs. This is the value that is sent
by the CACC2 vehicles, before the deceleration actually
Fig. 1. The ACC scenario, in which cars c2 and c3 use their radars to
derive the relative position xr,i and velocity ẋr,i of vehicle i.
Fig. 2. The CACC scenario, in which vehicles i use radio to communicate
their acceleration ẍi to their following vehicle.
occurs;
• Own accelerometer value: σ = 0.2m/s2. In the CACC1
controller, the car only sends out the estimation of its
own acceleration. This has slightly less uncertainty than
the modeled acceleration;
• Failure in broadcasting: 1 in 100. About 1% of sent
messages do not arrive at its destination.
• Radar range measurement: σ = 0.5m. The distance to
the preceding vehicle. This measurement is currently
not used in our simulations, but becomes important
when designing the controllers that have to keep a
certain safe distance.
These values can be seen as realistic. However, different
cars and technologies have different values of uncertainty.
Of course, we can change these values for different cars.
But then, the experiments would have to be done again as
well.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we will describe the experiments that we
did and the results that we obtained.
A. Scenario
The objective of our experiments is to determine what the
minimal safe time headway is between cars. Our experimen-
tal variable therefore is the time headway.
In our scenario, three cars drive on a highway, with varied
initial velocities. The first car starts braking as hard as he can
on t = 0. Then, we observe how the other cars react, and
if any crashes occur. In Figures 1 and 2, we illustrate this
scenario.
Using three cars in this scenario is sufficient for finding
the minimal time headway . Using more cars in this scenario
has no added value for the results. This is especially the
case for the CACC controllers, when cars should be able to
communicate their deceleration to more than one follower.
While this is not a feature of CACC in this work, we
do envision this functionality when further designing these
controllers.
The first experimental variable is the type of controller:
we did tests with an ACC controller and two different CACC
controllers (CACC1 and CACC2); the second experimental
variable is the time headway. We tested each value from
0.05s to 0.7s, with an interval of 0.01s. The third variable
is the initial velocity of the cars, that we varied from 20m/s
to 40m/s, with an interval of 5m/s. We ran each setting 50
times, resulting in a total of 3 controllers × 66 variations in
time headway × 5 different initial velocities × 50 runs per
setting = 49.500 runs in total. The main observable is the
cumulative number of crashes that occur in each setting.
B. Results
The results are summarised in Figures 3, 4 and 5. Figure
3 shows the results for ACC, Figure 4 shows the results for
the CACC1 controller and Figure 5 shows the results for the
CACC2 controller. From these graphs, it is apparent that the
ACC controller performs the worst, the CACC1 controller is
a bit better, and the CACC2 controller performs best.
V. ANALYSIS
From Figures 3, 4 and 5, we can see that the CACC
controllers outperform the ACC controller. This is what we
expected. The difference can be attributed to the fact that
the CACC controller can communicate its deceleration faster
and more accurately. The ACC controller can only react
on the actual deceleration of its predecessor, which makes
it much slower. The CACC2 controller is faster than the
CACC1 controller because it communicates its estimated
deceleration, before the vehicle actually slows down.
It is nice to see that the number of crashes drops very
steeply from a certain value. The crashes with the ACC con-
troller drops between time headways between 0.4s and 0.5s,
and the crashes with the CACC controller drops between
time headways between 0.05s and 0.15s.
The most valuable values of these charts are, for each
velocity, the lowest time headway at which no crashes occur.
These values are plotted in Figure 6. This graph can now be
used inside the controllers, to determine the preferred time
headway to a preceding vehicle. Because the uncertainty in
our models did introduce some outliers (see, for example, a
crash that occurred with the CACC1 controller at t = 0.61
in Figure 4), we left out the most distant 2% of these outliers
in this figure. The implication of leaving out these outliers is
that, when using Figure 6 as a guideline for minimal safety
distance, in approximately 2% of all emergency braking
situations, a (very soft) crash occurs. We argue that this
figure is acceptable, especially when keeping in mind that
this figure could have been lower if we would have done
more runs.
It may be interesting to compare these numbers with
the official guideline. In the Netherlands, the guideline is
to keep a time headway of two seconds to the preceding
vehicle. However, a comparison with this guideline is a bit
unfair, because nobody actually obliges this guideline. As








































Fig. 3. Number of crashes vs. time headway for the ACC controller.








































Fig. 4. Number of crashes vs. time headway for the CACC1 controller.








































Fig. 5. Number of crashes vs. time headway for the CACC2 controller.
































Fig. 6. Safe time headway vs. velocity.
stated in the introduction, current commercially available
ACC systems have a minimal time headway of 1 second.
When we compare this number to the results from figure 6,
we see that using a CACC controller, the safe time headway
is drastically improved.
The time headways that we found are based on our simu-
lation results, which performed under very specific values of
parameters in our model and the uncertainties. This means
that when the car model or the uncertainty changes, we
would have to rerun the experiments.
We will try to overcome this problem in future work.
Ideally, our system would run on-line in a vehicle and
is able to adapt to changing situations, such as different
weather conditions and malfunctioning sensors. And instead
of determining the number of crashes given some time head-
way, we will approximate the minimal safe time headway
given the uncertain parameters and some desired maximum
probability that a crash occurs. This will give our work a
better theoretical and statistical foundation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Conclusions
This paper describes work into the safety aspect of
adaptive cruise control (ACC) and cooperative adaptive
cruise control (CACC) strategies, taking into account the
uncertainty under which these strategies must operate. We
have modeled different strategies, including uncertainty of
information and communication in the model. Because we
included many different kinds of uncertainty that cars are
encountering in real life as well, we can use the found values
for safe time headway in the actual implementations of the
controllers.
Our experimental results clearly show that the CACC
controllers perform better than the ACC controller. We have
also shown that the CACC2 controller, that is able to com-
municates an estimate of its deceleration before the vehicle
actually decelerates, performs much better than the CACC1
controller, that is only able to communicate its measured
deceleration.
Future Work
Currently, we have only tested our controllers in worst-
case scenarios. This means that our controller can be consid-
ered only as a safety controller, that knows what the minimal
time headway should be given a certain velocity and given
uncertainty in parameters.
In the work of Naus et al. [6], a string stability controller
is developed, in which the safety aspect is currently ignored.
Therefore, we plan to combine our safety controller with
their string stability controller.
Another thing we are planning to do is to do more
experiments with the uncertainty in the controllers. Currently,
values of the uncertainty are explicitly known to the con-
trollers. However, in many cases, this uncertainty is unknown
beforehand or can change over time. We will look at ways in
which a controller is able to learn the correct values on the
fly. We need on-line machine learning techniques for this,
because these values are different for each vehicle, and they
may even vary on-line as well. This means that a controller
must learn these values for each new car that it encounters.
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